How does consociational power sharing impact ethnic divisions in Northern Ireland?
Introduction
The Belfast Agreement was a political fudge because it didn't actually address the issue of the land. It said that if people sign up to work together politically, then all will be reasonably well, we can look forward to progress, whatever that means. And yes, the violence largely disappeared, the economy has staggered along, but as we have seen, when pressure comes politically, then tribes revert to their identity (Reverend Thomas, July 25, 2017) I think that now, more than ever we're seeing a real brazen attempt by both parties to play constitutional issues and others to get people into more tribal trenches (Nichola Mallon, July 17, 2017) .
While the guns have been quiet for almost twenty years in Northern Ireland, the sectarian division that spurred the Troubles lives on. During the height of the Troubles, this division was expressed through violence. Now, ethno-national actors have moved from the bomb to the ballot box. As exampled in the two quotes above, sectarian political division has become the status quo. Through the consociational design of the Northern Irish executive, identity has been codified in the constitution and political process (Taylor, 2006) . Consociationalism, or ethnic power sharing, has designated ethno-national identity as a valid political orientation. Political parties act as "ethnic tribunes", focusing on issues of ethnicity rather than issues of crosscommunity interest (Dixon, 2011; McGlynn et. al, 2014) .
How does consociational power sharing impact ethnic divisions in Northern Ireland?
Through a qualitative study of twenty-four elite and non-elite interviews conducted between June and July 2017, I posit that consociationalism has in fact exacerbated tensions. Rather than a silver bullet for ethno-nationalist tensions, consociational design has institutionalized ethnic identity, empowered ethnic tribune parties, and led to an institutional neglect of the "other".
Literature Review

Theoretical Basis of Consociationalism
Consociational democracies are a form of power sharing in divided societies first engineered in the 17 th century, popularized by Arend Lijphart in the 1960s (Saurugger, 2014) .
Distinct from majoritarian democracies, consociational democracies share the four following traits: grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy (Sircar, 2006) .
Despite the face-value common sense of consociational design, it is not without its critics. Paul Dixon writes: "The objection to consociationalism, then, is not so much its four prescriptions but consociationalism's theoretical framework -primordialist, segregationist, elitist -in which these prescriptions are to be interpreted" (2011, p. 312) . Rather than the reduction of ethno-nationalist cleavages, consociationalism is said to lead to increased ethnic bloc voting (Taylor, 2006) . While violence has diminished in Northern Ireland, the ethnic tensions that led to the Troubles are alive, well, and encouraged by the consociational process.
History of Northern Irish Troubles
Dating back to exclusionary laws passed in the 16 th century after the Plantation of Ulster by British settlers, the Catholic Irish faced discrimination in the north of Ireland. In 1920, the island of Ireland was partitioned into the independent, mainly Catholic/Irish/nationalist south and the two-thirds Protestant/British/loyalist north, a self-governing region within the United Kingdom (Phoenix, 2017) . While the Troubles have many causes, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland has been the most important issue for both sides since the partition of 1920.
Predominantly Catholic nationalists yearn for a united Ireland, while predominantly Protestant unionists want to maintain the union with the United Kingdom (MacGinty et. al, 2012) .
After centuries of brewing conflict, sectarian violence escalated in the 1970s. At this point, the conflict was described as "a three-cornered conflict between the British Army and a militarized police force (at one stage c. 30,000 personnel); the Irish Republican Army (IRA, c.
1,000 personnel) and other smaller pro-united Ireland militant groups; and pro-United Kingdom militant groups (c. 1,000 personnel)" (MacGinty et. al, 2007, p. 4) . One part-time soldier in the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), a branch of the British Army, stated: "It was really bad, there were bombings, shootings nearly every day" (Dawson, 2014, p. 273) . Ultimately, 3,700 people were killed and 40,000 people were seriously injured by the time of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, a significant number considering the small population of Northern Ireland (Deiana, 2012) . The setup of the Assembly as established in the Good Friday Agreement draws heavily from Sunningdale. The deputy leader of the SDLP went so far as to call the Agreement "Sunningdale for slow learners" (Hancock, 2008, p. 203) . The Assembly holds 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), elected by Single Transferrable Vote proportional representation (Wilford, 2000) . Each MLA must designate themselves as "Unionist," "Nationalist," or "Other." These designations are used when special voting is triggered that requires cross-community support, a key tenet of the consociational setup. Within the Executive, parties are allocated ministries proportionally through the d'Hondt method, while the first and second largest party choose the joint First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Murtagh, 2015) .
History of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
Post-Good Friday Agreement Politics
In its brief life, the Assembly has had a tumultuous history. The Assembly was Paisley, the head of the DUP, "announced that they represented the 'burial' of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement on which the peace process is based, and he ruled out a return to a powersharing assembly" (Sluka, 2009, p. 281 
Criticisms of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
In 1975, after the failed Sunningdale Agreement, Lijphart himself discounted consociationalism as a viable option for Northern Ireland. He stated that Northern Ireland lacks three factors "conducive to consociational democracy": a balance of ethnic power, norms of grand coalitions, and national solidarity (p. 100-1). He held that view until 1995, when the IRA ceasefire and consequent Good Friday Agreement proved a victory for consociationalists (Dixon, 2011) . Criticisms of the consociational setup of Northern Ireland abound, but the most relevant include: the essentialist nature of consociationalism, the prevalence of ethnic tribune parties, and institutional neglect of the "Others."
Perhaps the most interesting critique of consociationalism involves the essentialist assumptions that consociational scholars make. Following structural identity theory, one's identity is "socially constructed and changes over the life course" (White, 2010, p. 342) .
Furthermore, "'ethnic groups' are defined by the context in which they find themselves… Ethnic identity can be crafted from within a group as a response to a changing political environment or the frustrations of the modern industrial state" (Denny and Walter, 2014, p. 200) . It is naïve to believe that ethnic identities will lose salience immediately after a conflict, but it is essentialist to assume that they will always remain fossilized.
While the goal of consociationalism is that such identities would eventually lose their salience, the means by which that would occur are unspecified. While it is important to acknowledge that Sinn Fein and the DUP have moderated their positions by embracing modern electoral politics, they still function as ethnic tribune parties (Whiting, 2016; Mitchell et. al, 2009 ). According to McGlynn et. al, ethnic tribune parties act by "rallying supporters to their badge on the basis that only they can maximize the benefits for 'their' community" (2014, p. It is not necessarily the difference in policy between the "moderate" and "extreme" parties that determines vote choice, but rather, the perception that the "extreme" parties are the heavyweight defenders of their community. In 2009, Mitchell et. al found: "three times as many respondents perceived Sinn Féin rather than the SDLP to be the most effective party in representing the interests of nationalists (p. 411). Among unionists, they found similar phenomena (Mitchell, 2009) . Voters elect these "extremes" as the voice for their community due to the perception that they are the most effective.
While "moderate" parties such as SDLP and UUP are left behind by ethnic tribune voting, non-sectarian parties such as the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) are also left behind by the consociational setup of the Assembly. As of 2015, 43% of the electorate identified as neither unionist nor nationalist, yet unionist and nationalist political parties represent 90% of the vote (Murtagh, 2015, p. 545) . In the 2016 election, Alliance maintained their eight seats, but lost support in every constituency (Bertoldi, 2016) . This phenomenon is largely attributed to the culture of politicized ethnicity; even if a person doesn't actively identify with an ethnic group, they will still vote for the party that most closely represents their ethnicity (Murtagh, 2015) .
While the electorate is an issue for the cross-ethnic parties, the institutional design of the Assembly proves an insurmountable obstacle. The process of cross-community vote and mutual veto mean that the designation of "other" holds little to no significance. In 2001, three APNI members were re-designated as Unionist rather than Other in order to shore up the Unionist majority for a cross-community vote (Taylor, 2006) . Ian O'Flynn states: "By effectively discounting the votes of the 'others' on certain important issues, the agreement privileges national over individual identities" (Taylor, 2006, p. 217) . One APNI member said that trying to legislate as a cross-ethnic party was akin to being in the "middle of a tribal dog fight" (Murtagh, 2015, p. 559) . By not providing an institutional method for cross-ethnic parties to thrive, consociational design falls short in its aim to decrease the salience of ethnic tribune parties.
Through these three arguments, critics of consociationalism argue that it amounts to voluntary segregation (Dixon, 2011; Taylor, 2006) . Through separate control of ministries and community control of cultural issues, what consociationalists call "segmental autonomy" (Sircar, 2006, p. 13) , in fact works as de facto segregation. Rupert Taylor offers one of the more scathing rebuttals of consociationalism when he questions: "If notions of 'separate but equal'
could not be intellectually upheld through any appeal to reason or developed through any accepted principles of social organization in the American South or in apartheid South Africa, why should it be any different for Northern Ireland?" (2006, p. 219) .
Defenses of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
While consociationalism has certainly been heavily critiqued, it has also been heavily defended. The core of this defense hinges on the lack of widespread sectarian violence and the moderation of Sinn Fein and the DUP. In Bosnia, another state in which a consociational agreement led to a ceasefire, Stroschein states: "Despite much criticism of the consociational structures established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the state has not collapsed again into violence after nearly 20 years" (2014, p. 112) . In this argument, consociationalism is defined not by the presence of democratic norms, a functioning legislature, cross-ethnic voting, or any of the other lofty goals that consociational scholars claim, but merely by the absence of violence. This speaks to the use of consociationalism as a conflict management tool rather than a true tool for conflict resolution. The problem with consociationalism is not in its use as a tool of conflict management, but rather in its long-term use. Intended to be a transitional tool, the failure in consociationalism lies in its inability to articulate a means to ameliorate ethnic divisions.
While consociationalism may not designate a method to facilitate ethnic reconciliation, it points to the presence of ethnic cooperation as one of its defenses. Using the involvement of Sinn Fein and the DUP in the Assembly, consociational scholars cite the moderation of these once-unconstrained parties as a testimony to the efficiency of consociationalism. In this way, the bare minimum standard of peacekeeping is hailed as a victory of consociational design. This is not to belittle the enormity of the Agreement; to wage peace after almost forty years of waging war is no small feat. Rather, this is to say that twenty years after the cessation of violence, the political process has replaced the Armalite as the weapon of choice for ethnic actors.
Consociationalism in Comparative Perspective
Consociational thought has permeated the world of peacemaking, proposed as a Northern Ireland has two main constituent groups: Unionists and Nationalists. BosniaHerzegovina contains three: Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Sircar, 2006) . Despite these differences, the similarities are pronounced. Many of the consociational structures that draw ire in Northern Ireland are equally contentious within the constitutional design of BosniaHerzegovina. The marginalization of the "others", ethnic tribune parties, and continued political unrest attract criticisms from scholars (Stroschein, 2014) .
Sri Lanka, another state with a consociational peace treaty, faces many of the same issues as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland. In particular, ethnically based electoral appeals are dominant in Sri Lanka. As Jensen writes: "both major political parties in Sri Lanka have catered to the Tamils when it fit with their electoral or governing interests" (1997, p. 24) . In short, the issues with consociational design span far beyond Northern Ireland. The continued salience of ethnic tribune parties, essentialist nature of consociationalism, and institutional disregard of "other" ethnicities permeate the essence of consociational democracies.
Methodology
Participants and Procedure
The data for this paper comes from twenty-four semi-structured interviews conducted between June and July of 2017. The audiotaped interviews lasted between ten and sixty minutes, and were conducted in the location of the participant's choosing. Interviews were conducted in participant's offices, coffee shops, and even the Member's Café at Stormont Parliament Building. Data were then imported into Quirkos, a qualitative data software package, where they were coded by theme and relevancy. All participants were guaranteed confidentiality with the exception of four elected officials, who kindly waived their right to confidentiality.
Participants for this study were recruited through cultural, historical, religious, and political organizations. Participants ranged from church volunteers to Mike Nesbitt, the former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. While interviews were largely conversational, a semistructured interview guide was constructed to direct the flow of discussion and keep the conversation centered on identity and consociational design. Questions included: "Do you believe that the importance of sectarian divide has diminished over your lifetime?"; "What do you think caused the shift from the UUP and SDLP in favor of the DUP and Sinn Fein?"; and "In your opinion, why are people voting on 'orange and green' issues instead of 'bread and butter'
issues?" (Interview Guide, Appendix).
Instead of focusing on either the unionist or nationalist community, I chose to conduct a cross-community, national study. This is a unique decision, as most qualitative surveys of Northern Ireland choose to focus on one community in a confined geographical space as a pragmatic decision (Zenker, 2006; Panzer, 2015; McAuley and Tonge, 2008 
Findings and Analysis
Through my interviews, I analyze the ways in which consociational power sharing has affected the political and social dimensions of post-Troubles Northern Ireland. In particular, this paper will delve into the institutionalization of ethnic identity, prevalence of ethnic tribune parties, and institutional neglect of the other inherent in consociationalism.
Institutionalization of Ethnic Identity
My findings on the impact of consociationalism on ethnicity fell in line with the existing literature critiquing consociationalism (Dixon, 2011; Denny and Walter, 2014) . Dr. Stephen No matter what you make of power sharing, it entrenched sectarianism, it entrenched division. You have to nominate yourself as either being unionist, nationalist, or other.
You have to define yourself… ("Reverend Thomas")
By requiring one to define oneself as unionist or nationalist in perpetuity by default causes ethnic divisions to replicate. By not providing a viable alternative to the unionist/nationalist dichotomy, the Agreement ensures that the division will remain salient. Will Glendinning, a former Alliance MLA, states:
The Good Friday Agreement has been extremely good at providing a structure for us to deal with, at a governmental level, the divided structure of our society. It was also necessary for us to cement the peace, in terms of reducing the level of violence. What it didn't do was deal with the identity issues: dealing with the past, parades, flags, and paramilitaries, which are the issues that are now there (William Glendinning).
In this way, it is not necessarily the structure of the Agreement, but it's shortsightedness. While the Agreement ended the war, it did not necessarily end the conflict. The Agreement, while essential to end the violence, did not contain the long-term structures that would ameliorate ethnic tensions, and has in fact amplified tensions through the institutionalization of identity inherent to the consociational structures underpinning the Agreement.
Ethnic Tribune Parties
In addition to the institutionalization of ethnicity, my findings reflect how the consociational structures of the Agreement have empowered ethnic tribune parties. Nichola
Mallon, the deputy leader of the SDLP and MLA for North Belfast, states:
I think that more than ever we're seeing a real brazen attempt by both parties to play constitutional issues and others to get people into more tribal trenches. I think that what we have seen is that the center ground, in this past Westminster election in particular, was badly impacted upon (Nichola Mallon)
In using the phrase "tribal trenches", Mallon is hearkening back to both the primordialism underlying consociational design and the ways in which ethnic tribune parties are quick to use that to their advantage.
Since the Agreement in 1998, the DUP has moved from 20 to 28 seats in 2017 (Whyte, 2002; BBC) . Sinn Fein has advanced from 18 to 27 seats (Whyte, 2002; BBC) . Meanwhile, the UUP and SDLP have declined by 18 and 12 seats, respectively. Dr. Farry explains the move towards tribune parties by stating:
To an extent, both DUP and Sinn Fein have moved to the center. They're not where they were 25 years ago… To some extent they've taken over the SDLP and UUP's territory, but you also have the electorate seeing them as being the stronger voice in each By designating candidates as "unionist", "nationalist", or "other", the choreographers of the Agreement were all but guaranteeing that the existing ethnic divisions would give rise to tribune parties (Mitchell et. al, 2009) . While the violence has ended, the ethnic divisions remain salient through the consociational design of the Assembly. While the political process includes all relevant parties in the conflict, fear is still a significant component of modern electoral politics in Northern Ireland. As Reverend Thomas states:
So why do you vote for these people? You vote for them because they're making you fearful that the world will end if the other lot gets in… Neither the SDLP nor the UUP were able and still are not able to articulate why people should vote for them, and not the other party. The policy differentials between say, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, in practice, are minimal. So, as the DUP and Sinn Fein have said, 'we are the heavyweight operators in our communities,' why would anyone vote for someone who A, can't dislodge them, and B, really has no credible alternative to offer the electorate? ("Reverend Thomas").
Likewise, Mike Nesbitt echoes this idea of block voting, stating:
As I see it, you basically now have unionists who don't even necessarily like the DUP voting DUP because they are fearful of Sinn Fein becoming the First Minister; they always want a Sinn Fein Deputy First Minister, even though it's an equal office… So it seems to me that people vote DUP or Sinn Fein not because they think these are the two parties that can come together and make a big impact on how we deal with our crisis in the National Health Service, or will deliver a better education system for our children, or actually deliver anything except cancel each other out. So there's a realization that them'uns on the other side are gonna have a big block called the DUP or Sinn Fein, therefore we have to make sure us'uns have a big block to cancel them (Mike Nesbitt).
Both Nesbitt and Reverend Thomas articulate the core of ethnic tribune parties: that they are ethnic actors that "lie beyond the formal political sphere, within the informal structures of ethnic politics" (Murtagh, 2015, p. 545) . Within these informal structures, fear and the realities of tribune politics weigh heavily on the electorate. As Bishop John states:
Even moderate nationalists will say, 'to be on the safe side, let's vote for Sinn Fein.' And a moderate unionist will say, 'to counter that, I'll vote for the DUP' (Bishop John).
Ethnic tribune parties are not about changing the status quo of government; they are about control. Unionists seek to maintain their control, while nationalists seek to gain control. As
Glendinning states:
The last Westminster election shows that we're heading towards polarization and a benign apartheid because the vote… showed people voting for a party not necessarily because they believed that party, but because that party is the one they see will stand up to the other. So there's still a lot of defining yourself by who you're not (Will Glendinning).
In the term "benign apartheid," Glendinning joins the ranks of critics of consociationalism in maintaining that consociational design separates rather than accommodates.
Institutional Neglect of the "Other" Stephen Farry: Anarchy, absolute anarchy. Technically, we could claim one of the posts, but whichever community was bumped out, that would cause tensions. But that's part of the problem with the setup; it assumed that unionists and nationalists would exist in perpetuity. They never really thought that far ahead… How would the structures cope with that?...
In this quote, it becomes obvious that the three main issues facing consociationalism in Northern
Ireland: institutionalization of identity, ethnic tribune parties, and neglect of cross-ethnic parties, do not exist in isolation. Instead, these factors interact and build off of one another in a vicious cycle.
Defenses of Consociationalism
While almost all respondents critiqued the consociational Assembly, many respondents had intricate views of consociational design. As Dr. Stephen Farry states:
It's one of those things with cause and effect, the Good Friday Agreement didn't cause these divisions, but it probably makes it harder to move along (Stephen Farry)
While consociational design did not create the sectarian divisions that haunt Northern Ireland, neither has it assisted in the latter parts of the peace process. While it did end the violence, it has not dealt with the more pervasive cultural conflict facing Northern Ireland. Will Glendinning states:
[The Agreement] was necessary for us to cement the peace, in terms of reducing the level of violence. What it didn't do was deal with the other issues: dealing with the past, parades, flags, and paramilitaries, which are the issues that are now there. So I would say that the problem is that it hasn't been fully and properly implemented… And I think there are things that need to be changed inside of it, to make it to work… (Will Glendinning)
The pitfalls of consociationalism lay not in the short-term conflict management, but in the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for long-term conflict transformation. Despite the lack of violence, the issues of nationality that spurred the conflict have not been dealt with under the Agreement.
Conclusion and Discussion
While the combat in Northern Ireland is over, the conflict lives on via political means.
Consociational power sharing has prevented a return to violence, but at the cost of an effective government. As of March 2018, there has been no sign that the Assembly would reconvene after a more than yearlong impasse. One SDLP lawmaker went so far as to tell the New York Times:
"I don't mean to be dramatic or anything, but I do think the Good Friday Agreement is effectively dead," (Kingsley, 2017) . Under consociationalism, Northern Ireland has been embattled by the institutionalization of ethnicity, ethnic tribune parties, and neglect of the other. This is a turning point for Northern Ireland. With the ghosts of the Troubles and the looming specter of a solidified border from Brexit, the peace cemented through the Good Friday Agreement will either sink or swim. Let us only hope that the region will not return to the violence that marked it twenty years ago. 
